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HOW TO BECOME MISS AMERICA
WITHOUT ACHIEVING ANY "MAJOR
ACCOMPLISHMENT" -
Some Thoughts on the Income Averaging
Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
LESLIE C. SMITH*
It has long been a settled matter of philosophy and tax policy, that
the rate of taxation should be directly proportional to the amount of in-
come received by an individual.' Neither is it often questioned that those
who earn a larger amount within our capitalistic system, should pay
for that privilege through increased rates of taxation. Thus, the "wealth
is spread" at least to a certain extent, without the use of more overt,
and more politically offensive methods.
The progressive system of income taxation does lead to certain
inequities. When income is received in "bunches" due to the nature of
one's employment, to receipt of a windfall, or to the use of a cash
accounting method, the taxpayer consequently pays more tax than his
counterpart who received the same number of dollars, but over a longer
period. Thus, the attorney who prepares a case over a three-year period
on a contingency fee basis, and receives income of $100,000 in one year
pays some $18,000 more in tax than the attorney whose salary is $33,333
per annum. Because of the system and its consequential inequitable tax
results, authorities have long advocated a system of "income aver-
aging."'2 Although income may be "spread" over a period of years
through a variety of methods,3 the term "income averaging" in general
*B.A. 1962, Vanderbilt University; J. D. 1971, University of Kentucky College
of Law (Articles Editor, Kentucky Law Journal). Formerly employed by the
Tax Division, Department of Justice, -Washington, D.C.
AUTHOR'S NOTE: Special thanks is in order for 'Mr. Eugene Silverman's(Trial Attorney at the Department of Justice) assistance in the preparation of
the portion of the article concerning Miss America Case. The author served as
assistant to Mr. Silverman in the preparation of the motion for summary judg-
ment. The views expressed in this article do not necessarily represent those of
the Department of Justice.
'For an interesting and informative discussion of both pros and cons of the
progressive tax system, see C. GALVIN and B. BiTrim, THE INCOmE TAX:
How PRoGEssIrVE SHOULD IT BE? (1969).
2See, e.g., Vicmy, AGENDA FOR PRoGR sslv TAXATION 172-97, 417-27 (1947).
3 Other methods available for "spreading" income over a period of time include:
the last-in, first-out (LIFO) accounting method (Commissioner approval re-
quired); the installment sales method; percentage of completion (available to
contractors) ; capital gains (gain for tax purposes may be taken at the tax-
payer's will); and pensions and other deferred compensation. In addition,
Section 172 (Net Operating Loss Deduction) provides for the averaging of
operating gains and losses over a nine year period. See note 5, infra.
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refers to a means of spreading income received in one year back over
preceding years when income was lower and the tax bracket more favor-
able. "Income averaging" is a term of art, referring specifically to those
sections4 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (hereinafter referred
to as the Code) which outline the method, conditions, and requirements
under which one's income may be spread.
Other inequities which are an integral part of the progressive tax
system are manifest. Section 441 of the Code requires the income tax
to be computed on a yearly basis. That is, income is reportable in the
year received, and deduction is taken in the year expended. The maxi-
mum standard deduction has long been $1000 per annum. For example,
if an attorney receives a contingent fee in one taxable year, which he
earned over a period of three years, he could take but a single $1000
deduction. However, his counterpart on salary over the same three
year period, and receiving the identical total income, would receive
three deductions of $1000 each. Tax rates which fluctuate from year
to year also result in inequity under a system of progressive taxation.
Thus, it is very possible that our attorney working on a contingent fee
basis could receive his income in years in which Congress had increased
the tax rates.
The purpose of this article is to describe the income averaging sec-
tions of the 1954 Code, and to point up some of the problem areas
which have arisen since the Act was vastly changed in 1964.
I. POLICY AND INcOME AVERAGING
Speaking generally, Sections 1301 through 1305 of the 1954 Code
provide for -the "spreading" or averaging of income received in the
current year over the previous four (base period) years.5 The Tax
4 INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954, §§ 1301-1305 [hereinafter cited as CODE].
5 There is some question as to what effect the operation of other Code sections
have upon the income averaging provisions. It would appear that any section
which would have an effect on the amount of income reported during previous
years, would also affect income averaging. However, sections which affect
future years would be of no consequence since income averaging considers the
present year and the four previous years.
Perhaps the best example of this effect is presented by the operation of
section 172 of the Code, which provides for a carryback of an individual's
business-related losses when certain conditions have been met. If an individual
were eligible and averaged in 1966 and in 1969 had a loss carryback which
disqualified the individual from using the averaging provisions, what is the
effect? Although apparently the issue has never arisen in court, an argument
could be made that income averaging would not be affected. Rather, since the
individual did qualify when he elected to average, the loss carryback will not
serve to undo what has been done.
This argument loses its thrust when the requirements of the Code and the
realities of the situation are considered. We will assume an individual's income
for 1966 was $40,000. Since he qualified to average, he paid taxes of $10,000.
Now assume a net loss carryback occurred in 1969 of $20,000 reducing his
1966 income to $20,000. Section 172 requires a new 1966 tax return be filed. We
will also assume that the "new" income for 1966 ($20,000) would not qualify
the individual for averaging. However, because his gross income has been so
[Vol. 54
INCOME A VERA GING
Reform Act of 1969, reduced the requirement that the income received
in the current year exceed the average income of the previous four
years by 133 1/3 percent to 120 percent. Thus, if one receives one-
fifth more income in the year in issue than the amount he has averaged
over the last four years, he may enjoy the tax benefits of these provi-
sions.7 Because of certain exceptions in the statute pertaining to capital
gains and the necessity of computing "averagabie income," the tax
return8 computation is a breeding ground for arithmetical as well as
substantive errors and should be double-checked upon completion.9
Though much relief was afforded by the 1964 amendment 0 to the
1954 Code, income averaging is a less than ideal solution to a complex
problem. Because the progressive system of taxation is established in
steps, and not along a continuum, it is possible that one's income in-
crease substantially, and yet no relief will be granted under the income
averaging sections.1 No tax saving is possible unless some portion of
a taxpayer's averagable income would have been taxed at a marginal
rate (the highest rate applicable to any portion of a taxpayer's income)
greater than the highest marginal rate applicable to 6/5 his average
base period income. In other words, a tax savings is conditioned upon
some portion of averagable income falling into a higher marginal tax
bracket. Thus, it is clear that at least to some degree the policy of
affording tax relief to those with widely fluctuating incomes has not
been achieved.
drastically reduced in that year, his tax bill would now be only $4,000. Thus,
our hypothetical taxpayer would file a claim for refund for $6,000.
One other hypothetical situation should complete the picture by illustrating
that both the loss carryback as well as income averaging may be employed if
each falls within the ambit of its respective Code provision. Assume that our
taxpayer's 1966 income were $40,000. Assume further that he was eligible for
averaging had his income been but $35,000 (133 1/3 percent of his base period
income). In 1969, he acquires a loss carryback of $3,000. When applied to his
1966 income of $40,000, his net income for that year is $37,000, so that when
he recomputes his 1966 tax, he may still average his income.
For those who are involved with computation of tax returns, enormously
complicated problems involving section 172 loss carrybacks and income averag-
ing result when an individual has filed both joint and separate returns, merges
or consolidates with another business, or incorporates during the years in
question.
6 Act of December 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487.
7Section 1301 also requires a minimum income of $3,000 in the computation
year.
8 Form 1040, Schedule G.
9 For examples, as well as step by step procedure, see Treas. Reg. § 1.1304-5.
Although this regulation has not yet been updated to reflect the reduction in
percentage increase required to average (from 133 1/3% to 120%), it is other-
wise accurate. However, due to the recent changes concerning includibility of
capital gains and wagering income, it would be advisable to consult the latest
Treasury pamphlet detailing averaging computations. Other excellent practical
assistance may be found in Frome, Income Averaging Provisions of the 1964
Revenue Act, 32 BROOKLYN L. REv. 120 (1965) and in M. ScHLuSSEL, 100-2d
TAx MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIOS-INCOME AVERAGING (1968).
10 Act of February 26, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, 78 Stat. 10$. CODE § 1305.
11 Sommerfield and Williams, Does Income Averaging Really Save Taxes. An
Analysis of Its Quirks and Weaknesses, 24 J. TAx. 198 (1966).
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II. THE MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENT RULE
Section 1303 of the Code sets out the criteria which must be met in
order for one to be eligible to "average" his income for tax purposes.
Prior to the 1964 amendments, the Code provided for the eligibility of a
very limited class of persons. 2 Although the Act purported to cover
authors and inventors, it did not provide for actors, athletes, architects,
attorneys, and others. Moreover, even in the case of authors and invent-
ors, the highly technical requirements 13 of the Act precluded use in
many situations where averaging was clearly called for. The 1964 amend-
ment (and, to an even greater extent, the 1969 Tax Reform Act)
liberalized the scope of income averaging considerably, both in the
method used to compute the tax and in who would be eligible to benefit
from the Act. The primary requisite is that an -individual be a citizen
of the United States and that he has provided more than 50% of his
support during each and every base period year. 4 There are, however,
three exceptions to this support requirement. Under the first, an
individual who has not provided at least half of his support throughout
the base period years is still eligible to average if he is over 25, and
during at least four of the years following his twenty-first birthday,
he was not a full-time student.15 Another exception allows averaging
if a joint return is filed in the computation year and not more than
25 percent of the total adjusted gross income on that return is attrib-
utable to the individual desiring to average. 16 Although these two excep-
tions are important, they do not give rise to the difficult questions
brought about by the third exception, the so-called Major Accomplish-
ment Rule. This exception to the 50 percent support requirement applies
if
(B) more than one-half of the individual's adjusted taxable in-
come for the computation year is attributable to work per-
formed by him in substantial part during 2 or more of the
base period years .. .7
The Treasury Regulations, promulgated under the authority of Con-
gress,"' give the rule its name.
(3) Major Accomplishment Rule-(a) an individual may be
an eligible individual for a computation year if more than
50 percent of his adjusted taxable income for the compu-
12 Several commentators have suggested that no real Congressional intent was
present when the 1964 amendments to the income averaging provisions were
enacted. See, e.g., Klein and Wiegner, Income Averaging for Tax Purposes-
Sources of a Statutory Solution, 60 Nw. L. REv. 147 (1965).
13 Old Section 1302 of the 1954 Code provided only for artists and inventors who
received at least 80 percent of their averagable income in the computation year
and allowed spread back of their income only over the previous 36 months.
14 CODE, § 1303 (a).
15 CODE, § 1303 (c) (2) (A).
1 6 CODE, § 1303 (c) (2) (C).
17 CODE, § 1303 (c) (2) (B).
18 See CODE, § 1305.
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tation years is attributable to work performed by him in
substantial part during two or more of his four base period
years. It is not necessary that the individual perform any of
the work in his computation year.'19
A brief examination of the legislative history affords better insight into
the intent of these provisions.
The House Ways and Means Committee Report spoke directly to
the question of who would be able to average under the Major Accom-
plishment Rule.
(One) concern of this provision is that the individual be a mem-
ber of the labor force both in the computation year and in the 4
base period years....
(This) exception is provided for the individual who, although
not self-supporting in the 4-year base period, nevertheless has
income in the current year more than half of which is attrib-
utable in substantial part to work he has done in two or more of
the base period years. This is designed to make sure that those
who have performed some work of a substantial nature which
occurred over a period of years will be eligible for averaging
even though below the 25-year age limit.2 0 (emphasis added)
The Senate Finance Committee Report 2 ' adopts word-for-word the
provisions of the House Report set out above.2 2 Thus it is apparent
that whatever predisposition guided the Congress (the Protestant
ethic has been suggested by at least one commentator) ,23 the intent was
to include only those individuals who, during their base period years,
had been "working" in some sense of the word. At the risk of over-
simplification, it could be said that the Congressional policy favors those
who have been "producers"-that is, contributors to the Gross National
Product or to the technological or intellectual wealth of the nation. There
is, however, no provision in the statute which does not allow an unem-
ployed individual who, because of some outside source of income,
meets the eligibility requirement of support to average his income. For
example it would be possible for a settlor-beneficiary of a trust fund
to realize an increase in income in the computation year of 120 percent
of the average income in the four base period years. Add to this the
fact that capital gains (to a certain extent) may now be averaged,24 and
the possibility of such a situation increases even more.
The Major Accomplishment Rule excepts persons from the require-
ment of providing 50 percent of their support during the four base years,
:0 Treas. Reg. § 1.1303-1 (c) (3).
20 H. R. Rle. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 114 (1963).
21 S. REP. No. 805, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 144 (1964).22 To the same effect is the JOINT COMMITTEE EXPLANATION OF THE House BILL,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. 110 (1963) : "The bill ... intends that the individual in
general must have been a member of the labor force in both the computation
year and in the 4 base period years."
23 See Klein and Wiegner, supra note 12, at 164.
24 Act of December 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487.
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when more than half of their income in the current year is attributable
to "work" performed during two of the four base period years. This
provision provides relief for persons whose work product was the
result of work performed over a long period, and who received "bunched
income" as a result. Typical examples include the young 5 artist, invent-
or, and author. Although it would appear that this rule is insignificant
when considering the relatively few persons who could be covered by
it, as the cases discussed below indicate, the rule is being tested by
certain classes who, although few in number, have rather large dollar
amounts at stake.
A. The Miss America Case
The first case involving the 1964 Major Accomplishment Rule was
Wilson v. U.S. (hereinafter referred to as "The Miss America Case"),
an action in Federal District Court for a refund of an alleged over-
payment. In 1965, Deborah Bryant (now Deborah Bryant Wilson)
entered and won the Miss Kansas City, Kansas Contest, the local level
of competition of the Miss America Pageant. After going on to win
the Miss Kansas competition, she participated in the Miss America Con-
test in Atlantic City, New Jersey and was selected and crowned "Miss
America 1966."
The experience was not a unique one for Debbie Bryant. Through
her teen years, she had participated in several beauty contests. She
had been selected Miss Teen America only a few years before being
selected Miss America. Most, if not all, of the previous contests were
25 Although the Major Accomplishment Rule may apply to older persons, it is
likely that persons over 25 would qualify under section 1303 (c) (2) (A) or
would have provided more than 50 percent of their support during each base
period year.
26 322 F. Supp. 830, 27 A.F.T.R. 2d 71-535 (D. Kan. 1971). The case has received
national attention from the press. See, e.g., Wall Street Journal, Feb. 10, 1971,
at 1, col. 6.
27 In addition to the income averaging question, the complaint alleged refunds
were due on three other counts. First, Miss Bryant had received some $600
during the years in pursuit of the $10,000 in scholarship funds she had been
awarded as a result of winning the Miss America title. The entire $10,000 was
held by the Miss America Pageant, a non-profit corporation, for withdrawal as
school expense receipts were sent to the custodian of the fund. The contract
provided the entire remaining amount would be paid in cash upon completion
of college. In this case, Miss Bryant received a check for over $7,000 upon her
completion of college but not during either of the years in question in the suit.
This issue was made part of the Government's motion for partial summary
judgment along with the income averaging issue. The Government argued that
the "scholarship" was a prize and thus includible under section 74 of the 1954
Code. In the alternative, it was the Government's contention that the money
was compensation and thus not excludable under Section 117 which excludes
scholarships from taxation.
The Government also claimed that the fair market value of the use of a
new Oldsmobile for the year in which Miss Bryant reigned as Miss America
should have been included in her gross income. In addition, Miss Bryant had
deducted the price of two fur pieces which she had been asked to purchase as
result of her being crowned. Neither of these issues were before the court on
the motion for summary judgment.
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judged strictly on beauty, poise and appearance, but did not include a
talent competition. Miss Bryant had taken a modeling course and had
performed some modeling before entering the Miss America Contest.
She contended that all of these things helped her to win the Miss
America title. Moreover, her life's ambition had been to win that title.2
After being crowned Miss Kansas and upon her entry in the Miss
America Pageant, Debbie signed a contract with the Pageant (a non-
profit corporation) which specified her future obligations and responsi-
bilities should she win the title. The agreement called for her to make
personal appearances at rates varying from $250 to $1,000 per day
plus her expenses and those of a chaperone.2 9 As a result of winning
the title, she was awarded a $10,000 scholarship. During the year
following her selection, she traveled extensively making personal ap-
pearances, generally on behalf cf commercial products and, to a limited
extent, on behalf of organizations. During that year Miss Bryant earned
approximately $80,000. On her federal tax return she did not include
the portion of the scholarship which had been paid to her, claiming it
was excluded from income by section 117 of the Code, which relates to
Scholarship and Fellowship Grants. She also "averaged" her income
in accordance with the procedures set out in sections 1301-1305.
Miss Bryant had not provided more than 50 percent of her support
during the four years prior to her winning the Miss America Pageant
and thus could only be eligible to average if she could bring herself
within one of the three exceptions.30 She attempted to qualify under the
Major Accomplishment Rule. The Commissioner determined a defi-
ciency, claiming she was not eligible under that provision. Miss Bryant
paid the tax and filed a claim for refund which was denied. She then
filed for a refund in Federal District Court for the District of Kansas.
The United States moved for partial summary judgment 3' on the
income averaging and the scholarship issues. The merits of both issues
were presented to the Court who took the matter under advisement.
The Government's position was based primarily on the language
of the committee reports and other legislative history surrounding the
1964 amendments. It was acknowledged that the plaintiff had entered
2
3 An interesting account of all the events leading to Miss Bryant's winning of
the title, beginning with her early years and culminating with her crowning,
may be found in Goodrich, Discovery of Miss America, SATURDAY EVENING
PosT, November 6, 1965 at 36.
29Miss Bryant was chaperoned by her mother throughout her year's reign as
Miss America.
30 See notes 15-17, supra and accompanying text.31 The Government's reason for moving for summary judgment was tactical as
well as procedural. If the income averaging issue were to go to trial, there
was the distinct possibility that the jury would in reality decide the issue.
Because of the nuances of the question (and coincidentally the charm of the
plaintiff which would, of course, be quite impressive on the witness stand),
counsel for the Government felt the question could only be decided as a
question of law by a judge.
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and won other beauty contests, that she had attended modeling school
(and done a limited amount of modeling), and that she had participated
in dramatic events. In fact, the Government did not question that her
subjective intention was to capture the title and that she had had this
intention and had accomplished some degree of preparation through
at least two of the four years directly preceding the year in which she
won the title. The government contended, however, that her income
was not directly attributable to work performed during two or more
of the four base period years.
The Government hoped to convince the court that what Miss Bryant
had done was to prepare for a contest, not to perform work which would
culminate in the realization of income. Perhaps the strongest argument
by the Government was that what was actually being paid33 for was
not Miss Bryant's preparation, but rather for her actual appearances
and testimonials during the year following her selection. She actually
performed the work for which she received compensation in the same
year compensation was received. Thus, the Government argued, as a
matter of law she was not eligible to take advantage of the income
averaging provisions.
Plaintiff argued that the definition of "work" included any form of
physical or mental exertion and thus included "working toward the
goal of becoming Miss America."
The plaintiff went on to argue that although she was not being paid
for preparation, neither is the novelist. What he is paid for is a book-
for prints and reprints. In essence, then, the plaintiff argued that the
legislative intent could not possibly have been to limit the scope of
the exception to those who labored over some physical work product,
while denying it to those whose work resulted in an intangible achieve-
achievement-in this case, the title of Miss America.
[T]his Title of Miss America... produced the income. Regard-
less of the girl who wins each year, it is the title and the demand
for the titleholder which produces the income.3 4
32 H. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 114 (1963) (emphasis added).
33 It should be noted that the $10,000 "scholarship" awarded Miss Bryant was
not in question on the averaging issue. This award had been omitted from her
tax return on the basis that it was excludable gross income based on section
117 relating to scholarships and fellowship grants. See note 27, supra. Had the
scholarship been included, there is little doubt that the amount could be aver-
aged if the recipient meets the eligibility requirements. In Robertson v. United
States, 343 U.S. 711 (1952), the taxpayer was successful in attempting to
average a $25,000 prize won in a music contest. See also Rev. Rul. 68-457,
1968-2 Cum BULL. 341. But cf., Rev. Rul. 69-110, 1969-1 Cum BULL. 203. Since
the enactment of the 1969 Tax Reform Act which allows the averaging even
of wagering income, the legislative policy would seem to clearly favor averag-
ing of such income.
3 Brief for Plaintiff in Defense of Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment at 3, Wilson v. United States, Civil No. KC-2968 (D. Kan., filed
October 14, 1970).
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The decision of the court was that Miss Bryant did not qualify for
averaging under the Major Accomplishment Rule.35 Judge Stanley
recited the general rule that when a statute provides an exception to
the general rules governing income taxation, the taxpayer claiming its
benefits must bring himself clearly within its ambit.3 6 He then went on
to hold that
• . . [T] he title.., provides only the opportunity to earn income
... She was being paid for these appearances, not for winning
the title of Miss America, and it is beyond dispute that if she had
not made these appearances she would not have received the in-
come at issue. Although it may be true that the plaintiff received
invaluable preparation for competition in the Miss America con-
test through her participation in the activities previously enumer-
ated, and that she did these with the object of becoming Miss
America, the work which actually produced the income was per-
formed only during the period of reign, and not in the years
prior to her selection as Miss America.37
Thus the first precedent on the Major Accomplishment Rule was
established.
B. The Heidel Case
In addition to Wilson v. United States, there is but one other case
presently pending on the interpretation of the Major Accomplishment
Rule. In James B. Heidel,3 9 petitioner attempted to average a bonus
received in the computation year for signing with a professional foot-
ball club. Under his first contention, he stated that he had in fact
provided more than fifty percent of his support since he had received a
full grant-in-aid for playing football at the University of Mississippi. It
was also his position that in the alternative his case was encompassed
by the Major Accomplishment Rule.
Here the Commissioner argued that what the pro football team was
paying Heidel for was not the years he played at Ole Miss, but rather
for future services expected of him as well as for his signature on a
player's contract. To say that he had "worked" for two of the four
base period years on becoming a pro football player would be naive.
Although some of the legislative history would indicate that athletes
35 Wilson v. United States, 322 F. Supp. 830, 27 A.F.T.R. 2d 71-535 (D. Kan.
1971).
The court found for the taxpayer on the scholarship issue, i.e., there was a
material issue as to the facts and that evidence would be necessary before it
could be decided whether or not the question was one of fact or law.
6 Id. at 71-537, 322 F.Supp. at 832. See, e.g. United States v. Robertson, 190
F.2d 680 (10th Cir. 1951), aff'd 343 U.S. 711 (1952).
37 Id. at 71-536 (emphasis by the court).
38 d.
3 9 U.S. Tax Court, Docket No. 5405-68.
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were intended to be covered,40 it is generally believed that the athletes
intended to be aided by the statute were seasoned competitors, rather
than newly-drafted players.
Although no opinion has yet been rendered, the court may decide
the case without reading the issue concerning the Major Accomplish-
ment Rule. Since Mr. Heidel had received a full grant-in-aid scholar-
ship for his football efforts at Ole Miss, he argued that this constituted
over half of his support during the previous four-year period, thus
qualifying him for averaging without the necessity of his falling within
one of the exceptions provided in Section 1303. In response, the Gov-
ernment position was that the scholarship constituted support furnished
him by the University and not support that he furnished for himself.
Since there appears to be no cases directly in point in this area as well
as in the Major Accomplishment Areas, the Tax Court's decision in
Heidel should throw some light on future trends in qualifying for income
averaging.
C. The Problem of Timing and the Major Accomplishment Rule
Under the provisions of the pre-1964 amendment, income received
by authors and inventors could be averaged over the 36-month period
preceding the year of receipt. Early cases, however, interpreted this
provision as allowing the income to be spread over the years in which
the actual work was done, whether or not they directly preceeded the
year in which the income was received. In Williams v. United States,
41
the court allowed money received in 1942 to be averaged over the
years 1929, 1930, and 1931 since these were the years in which the
inventor had actually labored over his discovery. Three years later in
the only case concerning income averaging to come before the United
State Supreme Court, Robertson v. United States,4 2 a composer who
had written a symphony some years before, entered and won a music
contest and attempted to average the $25,000 prize over the period dur-
ing which he actually composed the work. There the Court determined
that the 36-month period over which the income may be averaged, is
that period directly preceding the year in question.
The general rule under sections 1301-1305 of the 1954 Code is
to allow spreading of income back over the four previous years. How-
40 President Kennedy's message to Congress recommending tax reduction and
reform indicated the policy behind the averaging provisions:
My proposal will go beyond the narrowly confined and complex averag-
ing provisions of present law and will permit their elimination from the
I.R.C. It will provide one formula of general application to those with
wide fluctuation of income. This means fairer tax treatment for authors,
professional artists, actors, and athletes, as well as farmers, ranchers,
fishermen, attorneys, architects and others. President Kennedy message,
109 CONG. Rc. 919 Jan. 24, 1963.
See also H. RFP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 110 (1963).
4184 F. Supp. 362 (Ct. Cl. 1949).
42343 U.S. 711 (1952) affirming 190 F.2d. 680 (10th Cir. 1951).
[Vol. 54
INCOME AVERAGING
ever, as discussed at length above, the Major Accomplishment Rule
requires work during at least two of the four base-period years. Thus
it would appear that when. the taxpayer receives the fruits of his labor,
would determine whether he may average under the Major Accomplish-
ment exception.
For example, A, an inventor, worked on and patented an invention
throughout the years 1963 and 1964. During 1965, 1966 and 1967 he
diligently attempted to market the patent. In 1968, he finally began
negotiations toward an agreement with a large manufacutring firm, and
in 1969, he received $100,000 for the right to exploit his patent. Assum-
ing the other prerequisites of the rule were met, it would appear that
A could not avail himself of the advantages of section 1301 et seq. on
his 1969 tax return, since "work" on the patent was not performed
during two years of the four-year base period. Section 1302 (e) (2)
provides that the base period means the four taxable years immediately
preceding the computation year. Although not controlling because of
changes made in the law in 1964, the authority of Robertson would
seem at least analogous.
Thus, while the announced purpose of the Major Accomplishment
provision is to provide relief in just such cases, no relief is available.
A return to the holding in Williams, that is, to allow averaging over
the years in which the work was done, would seem more equitable, but
would further complicate an already intricately complex area.40 Further,
a determination of when work began, of what "work" is, how long it
continued, and whether it was continuous would be extremely difficult
when a long period of time had elapsed between the work performed
and the receipt of proceeds.
There is a corollary to the requirement under the Major Accomplish-
ment Rule that work be "performed by (the taxpayer) in substantial
part during 2 or more of the base period years. . . ."4 Thus there would
be some question as to the eligibility of A, our inventor, if he had
designed and built a protoype during 1964, and in 1965 and in 1966
had only changed a detail or two in the blueprints. In keeping with the
policy throughout the Code, the burden of proving the "substantial"
nature of the work falls upon the taxpayer. A few cases decided under
similar provisions of the old law may provide some guidelines. Mere
conception of an idea46 or the taking of a few notes would not qualify as
"substantial work."46
43 The burden of proving that he has worked during at least two of the four
base period years rests upon the taxpayer. Cf. Holbrook v. United States, 194
F. Supp. 252 (D. Ore. 1961).44 See note 5, supra and accompanying text to note 48 infra.
45 CODE, § 1303 (c) (2) (B) (emphasis added).
46 Cf. John K. Standley, 35 T.C. 59 (1960).
'Work' in the meaning of the statute [that is, when the work begins],
must connote something more than the germinating of the idea and
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What is necessary is work; probably something such as making
a model, working out formulas, writing the music, or rehearsing
and acting in a movie or commercial, etc.4 7
III. PLANNING AND FILING
In the previous discussion, it was indicated that certain other sec-
tions of the Code, when related to the income averaging provisions,
pesent complications. 48 Perhaps the most common concerns whether
deductions taken in previous years must be recomputed when income
is spread back over those years when income averaging is elected.
Several deductions are allowed by the Commissioner based upon tables
in which one variable is adjusted gross income. An example are those
tables allowing a deduction for state sales tax based upon family size
and adjusted gross income. Thus, an individual who is a resident of
Kentucky and is earning $14,000 per annum whose family consists of
three persons, is entitled to a deduction of $268 for sales tax.49 No proof
is necessary to sustain this deduction. When this same individual earns
$30,000 in the following year, and elects to spread income over the
entire period, may this deduction be recomputed based on the "average"
earnings. No such intention can be found in either the Code or its leg-
islative history. The same is true of the standard deduction, deduction
for medical and drug expenses and charitable contributions, each of
which is limited with respect to the amount of adjusted gross income.
Since the income averaging provisions do not affect adjusted gross
income in past years, but merely provide a Computation method, no
recomputations are necessary. Moreover, since income is higher in the
computation year, the individual does in fact reap the benefits of a
higher charitable limitation, an increased sales deduction, etc.50
Cash-accrual accounting. Under the earlier language of the income
averaging statute, 80 percent of the receipts resulting from the sale of
the author's novel, the inventor's patent, etc. had to be received in a
single year. Thus, whether the individual could enjoy a tax saving de-
pended upon the personal accounting system he employed. If he were
on an accrual method, it is more likely that he could accrue at least
80 percent of the receipts in a single year. But, if he were on a cash
basis, as are most individual taxpayers, he must receive or construc-
tively receive 80 percent in cash or its equivalent during the computa-
mental taking of passing data prior to the demonstrable decision to take
affirmative action to perfect the idea. Beardsley v. United States, 140
F. Supp. 541, 543 (1956).
47 M. SCHLUSSEL, supra note 9, at A-6.
48 See, e.g. note 5, supra.
49 1970 Optional Sales Tax Tables.
50 In United States v. Behle, 316 F.2d 134 (10th Cir. 1963), decided prior to the
enactment of the 1964 amendment, the court held that deductions must be
recomputed, since what occurred was the actual reallocation of income to
earlier years. Since adjusted gross income is not recomputed under the new
law, it would seem that the result in Behle may be distinguished.
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tion year. If he does not, even though the sale of the copyright or
patent has been completed, he cannot average.51
Although this requirement is no longer a part of the Code, the
cash-accrual apparitions still abound. If one uses an accrual system
of accounting, few problems arise with resptect to averaging. Once the
income is "earned," it may be included in the amount to be averaged
regardless of when the cash is received.
On the other hand, on a cash accounting system, employed by the
great majority of individuals, the cash must be received before it must
be included for income tax purposes. 52 The exception to this rule is
the "doctrine of constructive receipt." Under this court-formulated
doctrine, the cash method taxpayer must include income which, although
not yet received, is payable on demand. For example, salaries not yet
paid, but credited to corporation officers on the books of the corpora-
tion, usually fall within the ambit of the doctrine."3 Thus there would
seem to be no question but that income includible under constructive
receipt could be "averaged" by a cash method taxpayer even though no
cash had actually been received. For planning purposes, especially in
the small business entity, it would be worthwhile to check for the possi-
bility of averaging when fixing year-and office bonuses. If an additional
bonus of a few hundred dolllars would make the officer eligible for
averaging, the tax savings may be signifiicant, especially in higher tax
brackets.
In brief, anytime income is substantialy increased in one year,
whether one has control over the amount of the increase or not, it is
advisable to consider the possibility of income averaging. In addition,
because of the possibility of averaging in an already closed year, it is
best to maintain all tax records for eight to ten years.
51 See Whitman v. Commissioner, 182 F.2d 624 (7th Cir. 1950).52 Hyland v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 422 Cir. (1949) ; Kyle v. Commissioner, 43F.
2D 291 (3d Cir. 1930), cert. denied 282 U.S. 897 (1931).
53 See, e.g. Ross v. Commissioner, 169 F2d 483 (1st Cir. 1948) and Ward V.
Commissioner, 159 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1947).
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